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ABSTRACT
In this paper we study how volatility in monetary policy affects economic performance in the
presence of endogenously chosen information structures. Toisolate the effects produced by the
interaction of uncertainty in monetary policy and (possibly) asymmetric information, we consider
a model in which in the absence of either one of these features the equilibriumwould be efficient.
The equilibria that we find, with volatility and asymmetry of information, are inefficient for two
reasons: first, in some cases, economic agents fail to trade, even though it is alwaysefficient to do
so; second, to capture the rents associated with being informed, agents spend resources acquiring
socially useless information. Thus, in addition to the more standard effects of volatile inflation, our
model calls attention to two types of costs associated with monetary uncertainty: the cost of not
trading, and the cost of allocating resources to wasteful activities. The model implies thatif monetary
policy is not volatile all agents are symmetrically informed and hence, the outcomeis efficient.
Alternatively, making policy "transparent," i.e guaranteeing that all agents share the same
information, serves the same purpose.
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In this paper we study how volatility in monetary policy affects economic performance in the
presence of endogenously chosen information structures. To isolate the effects produced by the
interaction of uncertainty in monetary policy and (possibly) asymmetric information, we consider
a model in which in the absence of either one of these features the equilibrium would be
efficient. The equilibria that we find, with volatility and asymmetry of information, are
inefficient for two reasons: first, in some cases, economic agents fail to trade, even though it is
always efficient to do so; second, to capture the rents associated with being informed, agents
spend resources acquiring socially useless information. Thus, in addition to the more standard
effects of volatile inflation, our model calls attention to two types of costs associated with
monetary uncertainty: the cost of not trading, and the cost of allocating resources to wasteful
activities. The model implies that if monetary policy is not volatile all agents all agents are
symmetrically informed and hence, the outcome is efficient. Alternatively, making policy
"transparent," i.e guaranteeing that all agents share the same information, serves the same
purpose.
We study a bargaining model in which a buyer and a seller (both risk neutral) determine
the terms of the transfer of one unit of an indivisible good. If the parties agree to transfer the
good, the buyer makes a money payment to the seller. Residual cash balances are used to buy
units of a divisible good. Thus, cash must be used to undertake exchange in both markets and,
hence, the basic form of money demand in the model is of the cash-in-advance variety. We
assume that the realization of the money supply follows a commonly known stochastic law and
choose units of the divisible good so that its price equals the money supply.
We assume that the bargaining takes the form of a take it or leave it offer by the seller.
The buyer then decides whether or not to purchase the good. (This mechanism can be shown to
be efficient if either the two parties are symmetrically informed or the buyer is informed and the
seller is not.) For this model (see Chwe (1995)), it can be shown that a natural monetary
neutrality result holds: Proportional changes in the stochastic process determining the money
supply are neutral. Further, it can be shown that if either both parties are informed or both parties
are uninformed, there are no real effects of variability in the money supply. Because of this, there
2are no output or welfare costs of inflation without the presence of private information.
That is, even though the model is of the cash in advance variety, if information were
symmetric, the output and welfare effects of inflation would be zero. In contrast, when
information is asymmetric, a "lemon's problem" in money arises (cf. Akerlof (1970)). Since
both parties to the agreement share a common, but uncertain, value of the good "money," the
uninformed trader must take into account that the informed trader will adjust his actions to the
current realization of the money supply. For example, if the buyer is informed and the seller is
not, the only time the offer is accepted is when the value of money is low (i.e., the money supply
is large). Knowing this, sellers adjust nominal prices upward, lowering the probability of trade
below its optimal level. Since this does not arise in the symmetric information approach, the
effect we find here is over and above those of standard cash-in-advance models. Indeed, it can be
quite large when the level of volatility is high-- the probability of trade is zero-- even though it is
common knowledge among the parties that the buyer values the good more highly than the seller.
(Note that this is outcome is informationally constrained optimal.) Thus, this is one model of a
phenomenon common in hyperinflations, that some markets "close," with participants' accounts
emphasizing the difficulty of forecasting future inflation as the major cause.2 Moreover, since
this effect is in addition to those of the standard, symmetric information, cash-in-advance
approach, this type of model may eventually prove useful in resolving another empirical puzzle:
the size of the relationship between inflation3 and average growth. Regression estimates of this
effect range from a low of a .25% per year drop in the growth rate for every 10% per year
increase in the average inflation rate (Barro (1995)) to as high as .70% per year (Fischer (1991)
and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). This is a puzzle for standard theories since growth
models in which the supply of money is deterministic, predict --roughly independently of how
2 Heymann and Leijonhufvud(1995) observe that during the Argentine hyperinflation of the eighties many
shop owners refused to trade and posted signs that indicated they were" 'Closed for Lack of Prices'" (page 104).
This seems to be a recurring theme during periods of high degress of policy uncertainty. During the Russian high
inflation penod following the default on government debt in August 1998, newspaper reports indicate that stores shut
down because of uncertainty. ("Stores are shutting down as athey sell out of stock or pull items from the shelves
because they do not know how much to charge..." Chicago Tribune, August 29, 1998.)
Even though the literature has emphasized the impact of mean inflation on growth, it is almost impossible,
in the absence of a tightly specified model, to estimate the separate effects of mean inflation and inflation
uncertainty, since these two measures are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is estimated to be around .98
in a cross section of countries.)
3the demand for money is modeled-- effects that are qualitatively of the same sign but only one
tenth as large (see, for example, Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Chari, Jones and Manuelli
(1995)). Moreover, allowing the money supply to be stochastic, but with all individuals
symmetrically informed, does not help improve the "fit" (see, Gomme (1993)), and, in some
cases, implies that inflation variability and growth are positively correlated (Dotsey and Sarte
(1997)). Since the results that we explore are over and above the usual effects, they are
potentially much larger than those from the standard models.
The equilibrium of our model will feature, for some parameter values, different
information pairs. This has an impact for our predictions of the nature of the output-inflation
trade off. If the buyer is informed and the seller is not, high realizations of the money supply are
expansionary, giving rise to a "standard" Phillips curve effect (as in Lucas (1972)). In the case of
an uninformed buyer and an informed seller, the probability of trade is also less than one but,
here, high realizations of the money supply decrease output, and hence, the Phillips curve is
downward sloping. Thus, the slope of the inflation-output tradeoff depends on the distribution of
information. Thus, this class of models shows some potential to explain the finding (see Gomme
(1993)) that, in a cross section of countries, the sign of the Phillips curve varies, with a relatively
large proportion, 62 out of 82, displaying a negative relationship between realized inflation and
output. Thus, the evidence indicates the existence of both "standard," upward sloping, and
"backward," downward sloping, Phillips curves, both of which are consistent with our model.
In the model that we study, the economy-wide slope of the Phillips curve will depend on
the fractions of buyers and sellers that are informed. To understand the determination of these
fractions, we consider a game in which, at the first stage, buyers and sellers can learn the
realization of the money supply at some cost. In the second stage they are randomly paired. At
low levels of variability the expected value of any given amount of money is close to its certainty
value. Information is not very valuable. At the other end, high variance results in high prices and
low probability of a transaction. In this case, information is not very valuable either. This
intuition carries over to the equilibrium in which all agents choose their information structure as
long as the parties' values for the indivisible good are not too far apart. Thus, for both low and
high variances all individuals choose to be uninformed. For intermediate levels of volatility, the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies with varying fractions of buyers and sellers being informed. In
4this region, the inefficiency of equilibrium is due to two factors: first, trade occurs with
probability less than one; second, real resources are used to acquire socially useless information.
We show that the equilibrium shape of the Phillips curve depends on parameters, and is not
necessarily monotone. For example, at some levels of volatility, as inflation increases, overall
trade first falls and then rises as the effects of different match types become dominant. Thus, the
Phillips curve first slopes down and then up. The opposite can also occur. More generally, the
relationship between inflation and output is always non-linear, with the "shape" depending on
aspects the full specification of monetary policy (e.g., both the mean and variance of the growth
rate of the money supply).
The endogenous determination of the distribution of information implies that the model
has rich implications for measures of cross sectional price variability, since different buyer seller
pairs (as identified by the structure of information) trade at different prices. The prediction that
prices of similar goods need not be the same across stores is shared by other theoretical models
(e.g. the search models described in Sheshinski and Weiss (1993)), but, unlike the search
models, our model does not imply a uniform distribution of prices driven by the costs of
adjustments. Rather, price dispersion obtains as an equilibrium outcome even though there are no
costs of changing prices, and it is affected by the variability of monetary policy. Moreover, the
model in this paper has a sharp prediction: the relationship between the dispersion of prices
across matches is a U-shaped function of the rate of inflation. This is precisely the form found in
Tommasi's study of the Argentine experience (1993). (See also the evidence discussed in see
Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Eden (1994) and the studies in Sheshinski and Weiss (1993)).
The papers that are closest to this one are Casella and Feinstein (1990), Chwe (1995), and
Wallace (1997). Casella and Feinstein consider a dynamic bargaining situation in which there is
no asymmetric information and inflation acts as a tax. In their particular formulation, inflation
reduces the effective discount rate and this, in turn, affects the outcome of the bargaining game.
The key result in their paper is that producers will charge different prices depending on the age
(or wealth since they are perfectly correlated) of the buyers that they face. Chwe (1995) considers
a model in which buyers and sellers are asymmetrically informed about both the value of money
and their private valuations of the indivisible good. He shows that there will be no welfare loss
associated with private information about money as long as the value of money is common
5knowledge or agents share the same priors and information partition. He also shows thatwhen
individuals have different priors, monetary uncertainty can increase the sum of expected utilities.
Moreover, he shows that an equilibrium displays Phillips curve-like features in the case of an
exogenously changing fraction of informed traders. Wallace (1997) studies a matchingmodel in
which agents are asymmetrically informed but, as in Chwe, this decision is exogenous. A set of
buyers without cash reserves is chosen randomly and given money transfers (and hence they
know that some transfers have occurred). He shows, in a setting in which the structure of
information is not common knowledge, that a standard Phillips curve obtains with a short run
adjustment in output with a long run adjustment of prices as all agents becomeinformed. Our
work emphasizes two aspects ignored by the literature; first, it considers the impact of different
monetary regimes --identified with the degree of variability in monetary policy-- uponthe
equilibrium for a given structure of information; second, it emphasizes that the monetary regime
determines the structure of information, and that this is a critical element in understanding the
predictions of the model.
In section 2 we present the basic model for symmetric information structures. Section 3
explores the equilibrium under asymmetric information, and characterizes the effectsof changes
in policy uncertainty. In section 4 we endogenize the acquisition of information and characterize
the nature of the equilibrium distribution of prices and Phillips curve. Finally, section 5 offers
some concluding remarks.
2. The Basic Model and Equilibrium with Symmetric Information
There is a large number of agents of two types: buyers and sellers. Both the buyer and the seller
derive utility from two goods: an indivisible good which gives utility v" to the buyer (if
purchased) and v5 to the seller, and another which we call general consumption. We assumethat
utility is additive and given by,
ub(x,c)vx+c,
where xb,restrictedto be either 0 or 1, represents consumption of the indivisible good and c is
6the level of general consumption. We treat the seller symmetrically and assume that his utility
function is given by,
us (x,c)= V5 X + c.
We take the valuations of both buyers and sellers as common knowledge, and assume that
vb>v8. This assumption implies that trading the indivisible good is always the ex post efficient
outcome.
The buyer has an initial endowment of money m. If the seller announces the price p and
the buyer purchases one unit of the indivisible good, the buyer's consumption of the general
consumption good is c =(m"-p)/M.Here we have imposed that the price of the consumption
good is equal to the money supply M. This simply follows from our choice of units of the
divisible good, and can be rationalized by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint on divisible
consumption, the market for which opens after the value of M becomes common knowledge.4 Let
the seller's endowment be m5. Then, if he sells the indivisible good, his level of general
consumption is (ms+p)IM. Without loss of generality assume that m"=).M, while m5=(1-).)M,
where O￿￿ 1. With these conventions it is possible to write the indirect utility function (with
some abuse of notation) for each of the parties given that they know M and the price p has been
announced by the seller as,
(2.1) +Xxbp/M,
(2.2)u5 (xb,p,M) V5 (1-x') +1-?. + x"p/M,
wherexb=1 correspondsto the buyer consuming the indivisible good.
We restrict the seller's announced price to be measurable function of his information and
assume that the distribution of the random variable M is common knowledge.
It is possible to interpret M as the growth rate of the money supply, with last period's money supply
normalized to one. In what follows we will usually use the "stock" interpretation of M, although the reader can,
without any formal changes, think of M as a growth rate.
7First, consider the case in which both parties are informed. Here, given a price, p,
announced by the seller, the buyer's problem is to choose whether or not to buy the object.
Since, by assumption, he knows the realization of the random variable, M, he must choose the
action to maximize his conditional expected utility given M. In this case, he will buy the object
as long as p￿ v'M. Since the seller knows this and knows the value of M, the equilibrium has the
seller charging the price p(M) =v"M.The good is exchanged with probability one and the seller
extracts all of the surplus from the buyer.
On the other hand, if neither party is informed, the announced price does not depend on
M, and hence, the expected utility of the buyer if the price is p is his unconditional expected
utility. If he purchases the good, utility is,
A + v" -pE(M'),
while the expected utility of not buying the good is A. Thus, the rule the buyers uses is: buy if the
price is less than or equal to vbIE(M4). It is clear that --if the seller decides to sell at all-- he will
always charge the price
(2.3) p(M)= v"/E(M').
That selling at this price is also in the interest of the seller follows immediately from the
assumption that v' > vs. Let t =E(M')and, to simplify notation, let the 'information state' be
denoted by a pair, (11,12)whereI denotes the informational status of the buyer and 12 is that of the
seller. Thus, (U,U) means that both agents are uninformed, etc. We summarize this discussion in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1.
A: In the case of an informed buyer meeting an informed seller, (1,1), the equilibrium
outcome is characterized by:
(i) The indivisible good will be traded with probability one. [q(I,I)1]
(ii)The price announced by the seller is p(M)= vbM.
8(iii)The expected utilities of the two parties are,
W5(I,I) =1-A.+
W'(I,I)=A.
(iv)Monetary policy is neutral. The allocation and (both ex ante and ex post) utilities
of two agents do not depend on the distribution for M.
B:Inthe case of an uninformed buyer meeting an uninformed seller, (U,U), the equilibrium
outcome is characterized by the following,
(i) The indivisible good is traded with probability one. [q(U,U)1]
(ii)The price announced by the seller is p(M)= v"/.i.
(iii)The expected utilities of the two parties are,
W8(U,U) =1-A.+
Wb(U,U)=A..
(iv)Monetary policy is neutral. The allocation and (ex ante, expected) utilities of two
agents are the same as if the random variable 1/M was equal to its mean value
with probability one. Thus, they do not depend on the distribution for M. Ex post
welfare does depend on the realization of M, however.
The neutrality results presented here (i.e., Proposition 2.1 A(iv) and B(iv)) are
reminiscent Chwe's (1995) common knowledge results. There, it is shown that whenever both
parties share the same prior beliefs (which is the only case we consider) and their information
partitions are the same, money is neutral.
3.The Case with Asymmetric Information
In this section, we generalize the model presented above to consider cases of asymmetric
information. Throughout we assume that the information structure is common knowledge.
3.1Uninformed Sellers and Informed Buyers
Consider the case in which an uninformed seller meets an informed buyer. We study the
analogue of the game analyzed in section 2 in which the seller has all the monopoly power. More
precisely, we consider a timing of moves in which the seller announces a price, and the buyer can
either accept or reject. We do not allow any counteroffers. This description of the bargaining
9environment may seem restrictive at first glance. However, following the arguments in
Samuelson (1984) and Myerson (1985), it can be shown that this game implements the outcome
of the mechanism that maximizes the utility of the seller given incentive compatibility and
individual rationality on the part of the buyer when the buyer is informed and the seller is not.
Formally,
Proposition 3.1.1 Assume that distribution of M has compact support with a density which is
positive on the interval [m'S, mu], and that the buyer is informed and the seller is not. Then, the
outcome of the bargaining game is identical to that of the mechanism that maximizes the utility
of the seller given incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the buyer.
Proof All proofs are in the Appendix.
To analyze the bargaining game in this case, consider first the buyer's decision. Since he
knows the realization of M, given the price p, his decision rule is,
Ibuy if p￿Mv'
(3. 1. 1)
I.do not buy if p>Mvb.
The seller knows this rule (this is the sense in which he extracts all the surplus) but does
not know the realization of M. Since the seller is restricted to announcing prices that are
independent of the realization of M (this is where the measurability restriction is binding), the
seller chooses p to maximize,
.
(3.1.2) V [1 _J+(1X<Mvb))[v+i
_xI]dFM
where FM is the cdf of the random variable M. Note that if the seller charges the price pL=mLvb
the buyer will accept the offer with probability one. Thus, the seller will always choose prices
such that p ￿p'.At the other extreme, any price exceeding p'= muvb will result in a zero
probability of trade. Let pK denote the solution to this maximization problem.
10With this investment in notation, it is possible to give two types of neutrality results for
this model. First, notice that if the distribution of M is a point mass at some value m*, it follows
immediately that the seller will announce the price p=m*vb.Giventhis, the buyer will always
buy the object and trade will occur with probability one. Note that in this case, the outcome is
ex-post efficient. This is one sense in which without variability in the money supply, there are no
inefficiencies in this model. A second type of neutrality result holds even in cases in which there
may be welfare losses from inflation. This is that the equilibrium outcome of the model is
identical for any linear transformation of the money supply process. That is, inspection of the
decision rule for the buyer above shows that for the random variable aM with a>O, the optimal
decision rule for the buyer has a reservation price which is a times as high as the reservation
price with the random variable M, and, hence, the equilibrium nominal price is also a times as
high, etc.
It turns out that it is more convenient to parameterize the distribution of the inverse of the
money supply:
Assumption 1: The Probability Modelfor M. Assume that 1/Mhasa uniform distribution on [pt-
k,i+k], where O￿k <
Notethat given this specification m'l/[.t+k], and m'l/[1.t-k]. Finally, to simplify
notation, it is useful to express vsasa fraction of v". More specifically, defineby:
VS =(1-c)v".
Then, e measures how farapart the values of the buyer and seller are. This, in turn,
measuresthe potential gainsfrom trade between the two parties. Inthis paper weonly consider
thecase inwhich the differences in valuation are small (see the working paper version for the
othercase). Formally, we restrictourselves to the case €￿V2.Weneed one last bit of notation
beforedescribing the equilibrium behaviorin this environment. Let k(t,€) be defined by
11[1 —(1 —2€)']
The Equilibrium of the Bargaining Game
The seller maximizes (3.1.2) given its expectations about the realization of the money supply.
Optimal behavior on the part of the buyer is completely summarized by the "purchasing rule"
(3.1.1). We are now ready to describe the equilibrium of the bargaining game.
Proposition 3.1.2. Let 1(p,k,€) be the solution to the seller's problem (maximization of (3.1 2)
subject to bounds constraints) and let (j.t,k,e) denote the resulting probability of the object being
traded. Then, the equilibrium is characterized by,
i) If k￿k(.i,c), t,k,c)=p' and (ji,k,€)=1,
ii)If k>k(ji,€), but k<.t, pv'(1-2€)/(j.i-k) and t,k,c)=(j.t-k)[(l-2e)" -1J/2k<1.
In this case, trade occurs whenever M is large, i.e., whenever M ￿ ply" =(1..
2e)mU.
This simple model delivers the standard result in many fixed (or predetermined) (see
Lucas (1989) and Lucas and Woodford (1993) for examples with explicit micro foundations)
price models: an expansionary monetary policy reduces the real cost of goods for sale and it
increases output. In our case, the result is extreme due to the indivisibility of the good; for low
values of the money supply there is no trade (and output is low), while for high values, output is
efficient. The model also suggests an asymmetric information interpretation of the reluctance to
trade on the part of store owners documented by Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995). They
describe the following scene that took place in December 1989 when the inflation rate reached
suddenly increased from a few percentage points per month to over 20% per week in a short
period.
"A customer finds a good inside a shop, with a clearly marked price, and decides to buy
it. The shopkeeper refUses; he explains that the posted price has no significance, because
he cannot be sure that the wholesaler will not double his own price the next day. When
asked what he would do if someone offered to pay double the marked price, the
12shopkeeper answers that he would not sell anyway, for what if the wholesale price tripled
before he replaced the good?" (page 106, footnote 19)
This shows the effect of uncertainty about the value of money when deciding the terms of
trade.
Changing the volatility of M
Next, we will discuss the consequences of changing the volatility of the money supply upon the
equilibrium. Proposition 3.1.2 gives us a partial, but incomplete accounting for what happens
when uncertainty about policy is increased. There, holding ii fixed, as k is increased, the
probability of trade decreases toward zero. Notice however that we are simultaneously changing
both the average value of M (it goes to infinity) and its variance (we are holding .tE(1 /M)
fixed). The problem is that changes in k holding iconstantare not equivalent to increases in the
variance of M, holding its mean constant. For this reason, we will be interested in
simultaneously changing k and .tsothat E(M)=m* is fixed. It is easy to check that to keep
E(M)m* constant as we change k, tmustobey,
=k(e2m*k+1)/(e*t1).
It is straightforward to check that increases in k correspond to increases in the variance of M,
holding the mean constant.
In section 3.1 we described the constant k(p,€), which played a critical role in
determining the efficiency of an allocation. Since we are interested in changes in the variance of
the money supply holding its mean (m*) constant, it is necessary to describe the value of k that
corresponds to the threshold effect associated with k(p.,€). Let k' be the unique value of k that
satisfies, k'=k(j.t(k'),€). A simple calculation shows that k=1n[(12c)]/2m*. It follows from
Proposition 3. 1.2 that, for k￿k', the probability of trade is one while for k>k' it is strictly less
than one. From now on, to simplify notation, we will ignore the dependence of the equilibrium
variables onandm*.
13Calculating the effects of the equilibrium price and probability of trade when changing k
with ji. =(k)follows from a straightforward application of Proposition 3.1.2:
Proposition 3.1.3.
(i) The equilibrium price announced by an uninformed seller who meets an informed buyer -
-p(I,U,k)—-is
(3.1.3) p(I,U,k) vbm* max{(e*k_1)/2m*ke2m*k, (1_2€)'1(e2m*k_1)/2m*k}.
(ii)The resulting equilibrium probability of trade is given by:
a) For k ￿k', q(I,U,k) =1, while
b) For k>k'. q(I,U,k) is given by:
(3.1.4) q(I,U,k)= '/2+(e2ml)4{(1_2E) -(½)(e*k+1)].
(iii)q(I,U,k) is decreasing in k and limq(I,U,k)=O.
Direct calculations show that p(I,U,k) is decreasing for k<k', and increasing for k>k'.
Thus, in this case, prices are a V-shaped thnction of the variance of the money supply. In the
region (O,k'fl --in which trade occurs with probability one-- an increase in the variance of the
money supply forces the seller to lower prices to guarantee a sale, so that even in the lowest
realization of the money supply the buyer finds advantageous to purchase the indivisible good.
Thus, in this region, an increase in variance reduces the seller's monopoly position. Of course,
lowering the price reduces consumption of the divisible good on the part of the seller. Thus, in
this region, utility is redistributed from the seller to the buyer, but there are no efficiency costs of
volatility. At k =k',this decrease in consumption is sufficiently high that the seller decides to
charge slightly higher prices and face the possibility of trading with probability less than one.
Thus, in this second region increases in the variance are accompanied by price increases and
reductions in the transaction volume. Here, increases in volatility lower the utility of both the
buyer and the seller. Finally, the essence of part iii) is that when volatility is high markets close.
Thus, this gives a model of "Closed for Lack of Prices."
Even though Proposition 3.1.3 uses the assumption that 1/M is uniform, the finding that
the probability of trade is decreasing in the volatility of the policy can be considerably
generalized. More precisely, for any distribution of M, consider increases in risk as affected by
scale changes in the statistical sense. Thus, the Mk is "riskier" than M if there exists a k>l such
14that Mk =k(M -E(M))+ E(M). Then the mean of Mk is independent of k but its variance is
increasing in k. If the density of M is zero at both end points of its support, and is unimodal with
mean equal to the mode, it can be shown that the probability of trade is a decreasing function of
k. (Details available from the authors upon request.)
3.2 Asymmetric Information: Informed Sellers and Uninformed Buyers
Finally, we study the bargaining problem between an uninformed buyer and an informed seller,
(U,I). In this case the seller knows M and can announce prices which are contingent on M. We
will analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game in which sellers are first informed about the
value of M, second, sellers announce a price and finally, buyers, having seen the price, but not M,
decide whether or not to buy the object. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is then a choice of price
by the seller for every outcome of M, p(M), an accept/reject rule for the buyer given the price
(but not M), X(p)= 0 or 1, and a set of beliefs about the true state of nature for the buyer given
that the seller has offered the price p(M). Of course, X(p) must maximize the buyer's utility
given his beliefs and the price rule, p(M), must (for each M) maximize the sellers utility. Finally,
the beliefs of the buyer must be credible.
To analyze the model, first consider the problem of a buyer. Since we will only be
interested in pure strategy equilibria, a buyer's strategy can equally well be summarized by an
'acceptance set.' Accordingly, let A be the set of prices for which the buyer will accept and trade
will occur. For simplicity, we will assume that the buyer can only choose among A's which
contain their supremum. This is a restriction on the strategy space of the buyer. Note further that
given any acceptance set, A, the only relevant price from this set is its supremum, sup A, since if
the seller wants to sell the object to the buyer given what he knows about M, it is always in his
interest to charge the maximal acceptable price. If he doesn't want to sell to the buyer, he can
charge any price above sup A, but pU is a natural candidate. Given this, we can equivalently
represent the problem of the buyer as choosing a reservation price, which we will denote by pr
This version of the bargaining game is a standard signaling game where the seller knows
the value of M and signals it through his choice of prices. Not surprisingly, it is not rational (i.e.,
an equilibrium strategy) for the seller to completely reveal his information. Thus, he chooses
15only two prices, one (low) to signal that he wants to sell, and another (pU) to signal that he wants
to buy. As in the (I,U) case, for low levels of volatility the probability of trade is one, and it falls
for high values of k. Accordingly, define k= ln[( 1 +€)I(1€)]/2m*.
Proposition 3.2.1. In the case of an uninformed buyer meeting an informed seller, (U,I), the
equilibrium outcome is characterized by the following:
(i)If k ￿k',there are a continuum of equilibria indexed by the buyer's reservation price, p'
where pr ￿vbIM(k)These equilibria have a probability of trade q(U,I,k) equal to one for
mUvs￿ pf ￿vb/.t(k).The equilibrium welfare of the agents (in the equilibrium that
maximizes the welfare of the seller) is given by:
W"(U,I,k) =A,and,
Ws(U,I,k) =1A+ vb.
(ii)If k > k, there are a continuum of equilibria indexed by the buyer's reservation price, pr
where pr ￿ mL vb (l+€). The indivisible good will be traded with probability q(U,I,k) =
{c/(l+e)][2e2m*k/(e2m*k1)]< 1. Trade occurs when M ￿ M1(k), i.e.,
when M is low. When M > M1(k), the price charged is U and the good is not traded.
The equilibrium welfare of the agents (in the equilibrium that maximizes the welfare of
the seller) is given by:
W1'(U,I,k) =A,and,
Ws(U,I,k) =1-A+ vb [1- q(U,I,k)].
(iii) As k-oo, the maximum probability of trade converges to 2 €/(1+c).
Here, since the seller has a monopoly on market power (by virtue of moving first in the
bargaining game), and information, the buyer is pushed to his reservation utility for all values of
k. Note that in this informational setting, the Phillips curve goes the opposite way from the
previous case. That is, here trade occurs when M is small. Finally, note that the equilibrium
price in this setting does not depend on M (other than to signal that M is low enough so that trade
should occur), even though it could (i.e., the seller knows M).
In what follows we will restrict attention to the equilibrium that maximizes the welfare of
the seller which, in this case, also maximizes the probability of trade.
164. Endogenous Information Structures
So far we have taken the information structure of the buyer-seller pairs as given. In this section
we derive the distribution of information across trading pairs as the equilibrium of an information
acquisition game. There are three reasons for this. First, the results in section 3 were predicated
on the assumption that the parties to a match were differentially informed. Although it is
straightforward to show that when k is low it does not pay for anybody to be informed, it is less
obvious that when volatility is high some parties will still choose to be uninformed. This is
shown in Theorem 4.1. Second, an implication of the results of section 3, is that the equilibrium
slope of the Phillips curve depends on the equilibrium distribution of information. Third, the
model's predictions for the relationship between the level of inflation and the cross-sectional
distribution of prices --the type of evidence gathered in studies of high inflations-- also depends
on the distribution of information. To analyze these last two questions, it is essential to
characterize the equilibrium distribution of information and the volatility of monetary policy.
This is also done in this section.
To model endogenous information, we study a two stage game. In the first stage,
individuals choose whether to become informed or not. This decision is made simultaneously by
all players (buyers and sellers). In the second stage --given the information structure-- buyers and
sellers are randomly matched, and they engage in the bargaining problem described in the
previous two sections. We assume that in the second stage the information structure is common
knowledge; in other words, both parties to a match know whether the other is informed or not.
Thus, the equilibrium strategies for the second stage are those described in sections 2and3. A
second stage equilibrium always exists and, given our selection in the (U,I) case, it is unique.
Thus, we study the equilibrium of a one period game in information strategies that has as its
payoffs the expected utilities that were calculated in the previous section. The notion of
equilibrium that we use is Nash equilibrium.
We assume that the cost of becoming informed is given by (measured in units of the
divisible consumption good). This cost of acquiring information can be interpreted broadly as
encompassing private time and expenditure costs which can be affected by the government. As
an example, secrecy rules associated with the meetings of the FOMC have helped create a sizable
17industry of Fed watchers who try to estimate --given the fragmentary information available-- the
Fed's actual policy. If the Fed plainly announced in unequivocal terms its intentions and policies
well in advance, it is likely that this industry would greatly shrink. This is an example in which
would correspond to the cost of hiring Fed watchers as consultants. Thus, in this sense, 4isa
policy variable, determined by the "transparency" of the monetary authority. Alternatively, many
accounts of hyperinflations emphasize that individuals spend a great deal of time trying to
determine the real value of alternative transactions. This, in our model, corresponds to finding
the actual value of M, since this is all that is required to evaluate a proposed transaction.
We will consider only symmetric equilibria in pure strategies extended to the natural
asymmetric situation when the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The implied first stage
payoffs are given by,
Table I: Payoffs in the First Stage (E< 1/2)
Seller
Buyer











The functions Pjb,sare defined in the Appendix. Since this is a 2x2 game with known
payoffs, it follows that an equilibrium always exists. Since the maximum amount of surplus
available to the two players is vb -vs=evb,it follows that it is a dominant strategy for each player
to not purchase information if 4￿cvb. In this case then, the unique equilibrium is (U,U)
independent of the volatility of M. Thus, we assume 4<evb.
Theorem 4.1. Let 4<evb. For all values of k a Nash equilibrium exists. There exist values of k,
denoted k1() and k2() such that,
18i) k1(4)) <k'< k2(4)); k1(4)) is decreasing in 4)andconverges to 0 as 4)goesto zero; k2(4)) is
increasing in 4)andconverges to 00as4)goesto zero.
ii) For k [0,k1(4))), the unique symmetric Nash equilibriumstrategies are (U,U).
iii)For k =k1(4))there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibriumstrategies
are given by (U,U) and (I,U). In addition, there are infinitelymany mixed strategy Nash
equilibria. The equilibrium strategies are given by any mixture over {I,U} on thepart of
the buyer, and the mixture that puts mass one on U on thepart of the seller.
iv)For k E(k1(4)),k2(4)))there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. There exists aunique
mixed strategy equilibrium, and the equilibrium strategies are characterizedby the
following probabilities that buyers (Trb)andsellers (rcs) are informed (i.e. they choose I)
.b(k) ={(4)/v")+(I -T'(u,I,k))]/[( 1 _Ts(I,U,k)) +( I —T(U, I,k))].
ir(k) =[vbTb(I,U,k)4)]/vED(I,U,k).
v) For k￿k2(4)) there is a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibriumstrategies are (U,U).
As can be seen from the payoff matrix, buyers gain from being informedonly if they are
paired with an uninformed seller, and sellers benefit only if they are paired withan informed
buyer. In the region in which monetary policy is not too volatile even uninformed sellersextract
most of the surplus from the arrangement when facing informed buyers. Hence, in thisregion,
the cost of information exceeds the gains to a potential buyereven if he is sure to meet an
uninformed seller. It follows that it does notpay for buyers to become informed and hence,
sellers will also not be informed.
When the level of volatility is high, uninformed sellers set priceshigh when facing an
informed buyer driving the probability of trade to zero. Given this,buyers have little incentive
for becoming informed. Since there are few informed buyers, it doesnot pay for sellers to be
informed either. Again, the unique Nash equilibrium is (U,U).
For intermediate values of k --more specifically for k1(4))<k<k2(4))-- thereare only mixed
strategy equilibria. At the lower end of this region (low volatility) a large fraction of the buyers
are informed (how large depends on k'; if k'>k1(4)) large is 100%), since the gains frombeing
informed when meeting an uninformed seller exceed the cost. On the otherhand, almost none of
the sellers is informed. The reason is that, for k close to k1(4)), sellers donot stand to gain at all
19from acquiring information: the potential gain is equal to the cost since they are going to meet
informed buyers with probability one. As k increases, the fraction of buyers who are informed
decreases. The fraction of informed sellers increases up to the point k=k', and then decreases.
For k's less than k, as k is adjusted, the only change in the payoff matrix is a redistribution from
sellers to buyers in (I,U) matches. This increases the incentives for sellers to become informed
hence lowering the incentives to buyers. Since this is a pure redistribution, these effects exactly
offset, keeping the fraction of agents who are informed unchanged. For values of k greater than
k', there is, in aggregate, a loss in welfare as the probability of trade falls below 1 for (I,U) pairs
with aggregate information gathering falling as well.
The exact form of the the mixed strategy equilibrium in the region k1(4i)<k<k2()
depends on where k' lies in the interval (k1(4),k2()). In all cases, k' <k2(). Since our interest
is to show how monetary policy can lower the probability of trade, we will concentrate on the
case in which the probability of trade is highest. This corresponds to a high k' (see Proposition
3.2.1). It turns out that depending on the value of €, k can lie on either side of k'. It is possible
to show that k' > k' It is easy to check that this inequality is satisfied for
small values of e. In this case, the aggregate fraction of informed individuals, given by
(k)(rr"(k)+it'(k))/2, is zero for small levels of k, rises to half the population, and remains at
that level as k rises up to k. Further increases in the variability of the money supply result in
decreases in (k).5
The "identity" of who is informed also changes with k. This is important in this model,
since it is the distribution of information across buyers and sellers that determines both the
equilibrium slope of the Phillips curve and the cross sectional variability of prices. Neither
buyers nor sellers are informed at either extremely high or extremely low levels of k. At the low
end of the region in which the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, the fraction of buyers who are
informed, t'(k), is high (in fact, b(k1()) =1)and the fraction of sellers that are informed, 7ts(k),
Formally, aggregate information ñ(k) (Ttb(k)+ts(k))I2satisfies,
a)Itis zero for either k<k1(), or k> k2()
a) ic(k) E[0,1/2]for kk1(),
b) ic(k) =V2 fork1(4) ￿k
c) ic(k) is less than 1/2, for k1<k<k2(4), and is decreasing in this region.
20is low (it8(k1()) =0).As variability increases, b(k)falls,while 7t8(k) first rises and falls.6 The
behavior of the different measures of information is illustrated in Figure 1.
The Behavior of Prices
The model has implications for the effects of monetary shocks on the cross sectional distribution
of prices, and, hence, on the responsiveness of both mean and variance of prices to changes in M.
For both small and large values of k (k <k1(),and k >k2()),all agents are uninformed, and the
price of the indivisible good is equal to yb/EEl/MI independent of the realization of M. For values
of k in the interval [k1(),k2()), different information pairs trade at different prices. The
distribution of prices has the same qualitative characteristics for all values of k in this region, but,
the actual prices charged in a (U,I) match depend on the location of k relative to k'. To illustrate
this we consider the case k￿k'. The distribution of prices across information pairs is given by:7
Information state Probability Price Charged
(U, U) (l_rl)(1_t8) v"/E[l/N'I]
(I, I) b s v"M
(I, U) b(ls) v"(l —2€)L'2mU(k)
(U, I) (11tb) s vb(1 +€)mL(k)if M￿ M1(k)
vmU(k)if M >_M1(k)
Note that, given k, there are only two information pairs for which the price charged
6 Formally,
a) t'(k1(4))1, O<ic"(k2(4))<l, and itk) is decreasing ink, if
[(/€v")(1 +€)+1—€][1—(1 )hI2]
b) it(k1(4)) = k2(4))=0,and it(k) is increasing for k<k? and decreasing for k>k1.
Recall that (U,I) pairs trade whenever M is below M,1(k),and(I,U) pairs trade whenever M is above
M1(k).
21depends on M. The first is the (1,1) pair, where changes in M are matched perfectly. The other is
the case of the informed seller and uninformed buyer where the price jumps discontinuously up
when that M is reached where the equilibrium calls for the seller to choke off all trade. Given
this property, it follows that the conditional mean and variance of prices given M have simple
forms. The average value of prices is given by:
15(M;k)=a0 + Vtl)7tSM if M ￿ M1(k), and
p(M;k)=a1 + v1'it"t M if M > M1(k),
for some constants a0 and aThus,even though prices are responsive to monetary shocks in this
region, they are sluggish in the sense that they are less responsive than would be predicted by a
full information flexible price model (pvbM).
Next, let o(M;k) denote the cross sectional variance of prices (again taken across all
pairs of traders). For low and high values of k, o(M;k) =0.For k￿k',
o(M;k) =+iilits (v")2 M2 -(a0+ vt)its M )2if M ￿ M1(k), and
o(M;k) =+bs (yb)2 M2 -(a +v'rct' M )2if M > M1(k),
where, again,andare constants. Thus, ofollowstwo quadratics, jumping from one to the
other at M =M1(k).Since, the coefficient on the M2 term in both of these expressions is
(vb)2[(ltblts)2J > 0, they are both U-shaped. Moreover, it can be shown that if is small, they
are both minimized within the range [m''(k), m'(k)]. Thus, for a given k, o(M;k) is a non-
monotone function of M, first falling and then rising. This matches a common finding in the
empirical literature on the effects of high inflations. In particular, in his study of the Argentine
hyperinflation, Tommasi (1993) analyzes data on the relationship between the cross sectional
variance of prices in a period and the level of inflation in that period and finds that it is non-
monotonic. He finds that this dispersion is decreasing in the level of inflation for low levels and
22increasing for high levels.8
The Equilibrium Phillips Curve
Is the model consistent with both upward and downward bending Phillips curves? To show that
this is possible consider two cases. If k <k' and k E (k',k') the only pair that fails to trade for
any realization of the monetary shock is (I,U). This pair does not trade only when the value of M
is low (see Proposition 3.1.2). Thus, in this region, the Phillips curve slopes upward. On the other
hand, if k' <k' and k E(k',k'),then the only pairs that do not trade all the time are uninformed
buyers and informed sellers. In this case, Proposition 3.2.1 shows that the Phillips curve slopes
downward.
In addition to these two possibilities, the model has rich and complex implications for the
shape of the inflation-output tradeoff. Since, the particular details depend on parameter values,
here we restrict attention to the case k' <k', and describe how the Phillips curve changes as a
function of k. For k￿k', all information pairs trade with probability one; thus the Phillips curve is
perfectly flat. As noted above, for k E(k',k'),it is upward sloping. The region {k,k2()) is more
interesting because both the (I,U) pairs and the (U,I) pairs may not trade depending on the
realization of M. The pairs (I,U) trade whenever the realization of M exceeds the threshold
M(k) while the (U,I) pairs trade whenever M falls short of M1(k).There are two cases which
correspond to MLT(k) <M1(k) and M(k) >M1(k).Which one of these obtains depends on the
value of k.
Case I: M(k) >M1(k)
This case corresponds to a low value of k. In the region [mL(k), M1(k)] all information
pairs but (I,U) trade; output is "moderately" low. In the region [M,1(k), M(k)J neither
the (I,U) or the (U,I) information pairs trade, and output is low. Finally, in the region
[M(k), m'(k)] the only pair that fails to trade is (U,I); hence, output is again
"moderately" low. Overall, the relationship between M and output has a U-shape.
8InTommasi's empirical study, he finds that price dispersion is minimized at zero inflation. However, the
functional forms that he considers only allow the minimum to be at zero.
23Case II: M(k) <M,1(k).
This case corresponds to a high value of k. In the region [mL(k), M(k)] all information
pairs but (I,U) trade; output is "moderately" low. In the region [M(k),M1(k)] all
information pairs trade, and output is high. Finally, in the region [M1(k), mU(k)] the only
pair that fails to trade is (U,I); hence, output is again "moderately" low. Overall, the
relationship between M and output resembles an inverted-U.
Thus, even in a simple model like the one in this paper the sign of the slope of the
Phillips curve depends on both the parameters of the model (e.g. k,e,4) and the realization of M.
Hence, any econometric study should allow for the non-linearities associated with these different
regimes.
5. Concluding Comments and Extensions
In this paper we have presented a model in which perfectly anticipated inflation is superneutral:
if the variance of the money supply (or the growth rate of the money supply) is zero, the real
equilibrium is independent of the mean of the money supply (or growth rate). On the other hand,
it was shown that increases in the variability of the money supply holding its mean constant can
have substantial real effects. The key feature is that --even when the decision to become informed
is endogenous-- there is ex-post asymmetric information. This gives rise to efficiency effects of
volatility for two reasons. First, given an information state, the probability of trade is decreasing
in the level of volatility. Thus, there are states in which the good should be traded, but it is not.
In addition to this, when information gathering is endogenous, the decision to become informed
costs real resources. In this model, the social value of information is zero (it only redistributes
bargaining power between the buyer and seller) and hence, any such activity is a loss in
efficiency. This gives rise to a clear policy recommendation from the model: Set volatility at
zero. In this case, the outcome is efficient. Moreover, in contrast to the standard cash
goods/credit goods treatment of the impact of inflation, the welfare cost that we find extends to
all nominally denominated transactions, and not only to those in which cash is the medium of
exchange. This effect, increases the cost of inflation relative to the one derived in that cashlcredit
24good calculation.
The model can account, qualitatively, for several puzzling observations: First, it implies
that the cross-sectional distribution of prices is not degenerate even when all agents are
symmetric ex ante. Indeed the variance of the cross sectional distribution of prices is not a
monotonic ftinction of the realization of the inflation: At low levels, an increase in the rate of
inflation decreases the dispersion of prices while it increases it for high levels. This agrees with
the evidence during high inflations. Second, it is consistent with both upward and downward
sloping Phillips curves. This is due to the effect that different monetary regimes have on both the
fraction and identity of the agents that are informed. Finally, if we allow for different costs of
acquiring information, the model can explain while, in the face of extremely high uncertainty,
sellers would rather close than sell.
The model can be extended along several dimensions. First, even though we discussed a
"static" version, it is possible to show that the same decision rules apply to a dynamic infinite
horizon version in which each family is composed of a buyer-seller pair. In such a dynamic
setting, the model also delivers the implication that nominal interest rates are "sluggish," in the
sense that they do not increase one for one with mean inflation. Moreover, increases in the
variance of the monetary shock, holding average inflation constant, reduce nominal interest rates,
leaving real rates unchanged. (For details see the working paper version.). Second, the model
suggests a role for inventories in periods of high inflation. If the good is storable, the breakdown
of trade will occur at even more moderate levels of inflation.
Finally, the mechanism that we capture, uncertainty about government policies with costs
of learning the true policy, is more general than our monetary interpretation. The basic intuition,
that in these cases the lemon's nature of the game between asymmetrically informed agents can
exacerbate the effects of uncertainty, should apply to other policies as well. Interesting
possibilities include exchange rate policy and debt repayment policy which we hope to study in
future work.
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27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1.1: Although not identical, the proof follows the arguments in Myerson (1985) and
Samuelson (1984) very closely. A mechanism is described by a probability of trading the indivisible good as
a function of the state, M, q(M) and a state contingent transfer of the divisible good, T(M) from the buyer to
the seller. With this notation, the utility of the buyer is given by:
U' (M) =v'q(M) +(mi' -T(M))/M=v'q(M) +)-T(M)/M
while that of the seller is given by:
US (M) =vs(1-q(M)) +(ms +T(M))/M=vs-v5q(M) +1-),.+T(M)/M.
The mechanism, (q(M), T(M)) is feasible if:
1. O￿ q(M) ￿ 1for all M.
2. For all M, M', v' q(M) +. - T(M)IM￿v'q(M') +A-T(M')/M.
3. For all M, v' q(M) +A-T(M)/M￿v'0 +A-0/M=A.
Here, 2 invokes the revelation principle to get that truth telling is an equilibrium (i.e., incentive
compatibility holds) and 3 captures individual rationality. Note that feasibility implies that a
mechanism is feasible if and only if:
1. O￿ q(M) ￿ 1for aIIM.
2. For all M, M', M vt' q(M) -T(M)￿Mv" q(M') -T(M').
3. For all M, M vbq(M) -T(M)￿0.
Now, let rc(M,M') =Mv' q(M') -T(M').This is the utility that the buyer will receive if the true state is M
and he armounces that the state is M'. Then, one obtains that for any feasible mechanism:
4. v' (M-M') q(M') ￿Tt(M,M)-it(M',M')￿v1'(M-M') q(M).
5. it(M) Tt(M,M) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant v' (and hence differentiable
almost everywhere).
6. q is weakly increasing in M.
7. d7t(M)/dM =vt'q(M) everywhere tisdifferentiable.
Note that 4 follows from applying incentive compatibility. 5 follows immediately from 4. 6 follows from 4
with M￿ M'. 7 follows from 4 by taking the limit as (M-M') goes to zero. It follows that the
mechanism is individually rational for the buyer if and only if lt(mL)￿O. (This follows from 2 and 7).
Our next goal is to characterize the utility of the seller for any feasible mechanism. Recall that this
is given by:
.=1_A+7{vs_vsqm÷TJfmdm=1_A+v÷mj[T_v1qm]fMmdm
The idea here is to get rid of T(m)/m in this expression by using what we have already shown about









28Using a change of variables and the fact that ''tismonotone, we can rewrite this is as:
b LfM(m) b U+1t(m )f dm÷ fv R(s)q(s)ds
m
m
whereR(s) is defined by:
R(s)=f
fM(m)dm
Giventhis, we can write:
U 'v + 1 -X -(m L)f
fM(m)dm +f v b -v '-V bR(m)f(m)q(m)dm. m fM(m)
In order to find the mechanism that maximizes the utility of the seller, it is clear that rc(m') =0.
Thus, it follows that the mechanism that maximizes the seller's utility is that which maximizes
,, (b ubR(m) U v ÷i-X+ v -v -v f(m)q(m)dm. f(m) M
where q must lie between 0 and I and must be weakly increasing. Since US is linear in q it follows that the
solution to this problem is to set q equal to either 0 or 1 only. Thus, we have that the mechanism that
maximizes the utility of the seller is of the form q(m) =0for all m in [mL, m'] and q(m) =Ifor all m in (m',
mu] for some choice of m'. Thus, the outcome of this mechanism is the same as that of the bargaining game
analyzed in section 3.1. That the mechanism is as described follows from the argument given above.
To see that this coincides with the bargaining game, note that incentive compatibility requires that
the transfer T(M) be the same for all m's with the same probability of exchanging the object. Thus, T(M)
can take two possible values: T1 when the probability of trade is one, and T0 when the probability of trade is
zero. We now argue that T0 must equal zero. To see this recall that if q(M) is ever zero --the only relevant
case as otherwise it follows that T(M) is constant-- it must be zero at M=m'. However, at this point Tc(mL) =
-T(m')=-T0.Since we have shown that t(mL) =0, it follows that T0=0. Hence, the outcome of this
mechanism is the same as one which transfers TL from the buyer to the seller and charges the price, p =
anytimethe object is traded. If q(m')=l, it follows that q(M)1 for all M, and that in this case the object is
always traded and the seller receives a payment equal to T1p.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.2: It is convenient to describe (3.1.2) in terms of the distribution of the inverse of
the money supply. Thus, let F be the cdf of the random variable 1/M, and assume that it has a density f. The
random variable M is assumed bounded, Note that an equivalent description of the optimal
decision rule by the buyer is that he buys the indivisible good if and only if 1/M<v1'/p. Thus, the seller's
indirect utility over prices is given by,
29b
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This objective function is continuous but not differentiable in the interior of R÷. The interval [0,pL]
is easy to handle. In this region, the good will be sold with probability one, and the function V'(p) is
increasing in p. It follows that the seller will never announce a price less than L Let pU be the lowest price
such that the buyer does not purchase the good for any realization of M. In our setting p' is given by v1'/(ji-
k). For prices p￿p', the function Vs(p) is just I-A+(l-€)v', a constant. It is immediate to check that in the
interval (pL,pU) function is strictly concave if €<1/2, and linear if e=1/2. If €<1/2, the first order condition
for the seller's maximization problem with the additional requirements that >L (with Lagrange multiplier
y) is,
J xf(x)dx -(1/p)2f(v1'/p)[(vt')2 vbvs] +y=0,
or,
f xf(x)dx -(v'/p)2f(vb/p)€ +y=0,
where z= yb/p and y=1/mU. Using the specific form for f(x) we get,
y =(v"/p)2 (1/2k)€-( 1 /2k)(V2)[(vb/p)2(k)2J.
Alternatively, this condition is,
(*)4k1 =(v'/p)2(2€-l)+(1.t-k)2.
Depending on the size of ji-k, it is possible that even when p=pL, the Lagrange multiplier is positive.




or, recalling the definition of k(i,c),
kL =k(p,€).
From the definition of k(j.i,€) it follows that kL is unique. We now show that for k>kL the unique p
that solves the first order condition assuming yO is strictly greater than L To see this impose y0 and
solve for p. The solution is,
30= vb(12€)/(k).
To check that >L we need to check that,
vb(12E)/Qk)>v1'/(j.i+k),
whichcorresponds to,
(l2E)¼> (j.t-k)/(p.+k), or equivalently, k > k(p€).
The candidate solution automatically satisfies p<pu=vb/(,.jk). Finally, note that the probability of trade is




If c=1/2, it is easy to check that the derivative of Vs(p) is negative and given by -(t-k)2/2k on
(pLpU) It follows that the optimal policy is to charge L which results in a sale with probability one.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1: To characterize equilibrium in this setting, we will first treat pf parametrically
and impose rationality on the part of the buyer below. Given a level of pt, we can characterize the optimal
behavior of the seller. If the seller chooses the price pT, he sells the object and hence receives utility l-?
+p7M, while if he charges any price higher than pr, he does not sell the object and hence receives utility 1-A
+v5. Thus, he will charge the price pT if and only if M￿min(mU, pr /vs) M*. If, on the other hand, M>M*,
he will charge some price higher than pt. Without loss of generality, we will assume that he charges the
highest possible price, p", in this case.
This description of the optimal behavior of the seller given any reservation price rule determines the
beliefs of the buyer using Bayes Rule. If the buyer sees the price pr, the conditional distribution on l/M
given p=pt is uniform on the interval [1/M*, .i+k], while if the buyer sees the price pU, the conditional
distribution on l/M given p=pL is uniform on the interval [.ik,lIM*]. As is standard in these models,
beliefs are not pinned down for any other values of p without making further assumptions.
Given these restrictions on beliefs, we will now derive the restrictions on buyers' behavior that
results from optimal decision making on his part. First, the utility received by the buyer if he buys and the
price is pr is given by:
UA+ f [v -.--JdFrrrA+y_L._i_+_i_
bM Mip b2 M* mL
On the other hand, if he does not buy, his utility is A. Thus, the restrictions imposed by rationality
by the buyer reduces to two cases. The first is jfpt/yS ￿ mu. In this case, optimality of the buyers decision
rule can be simplified to:
pt< m' vb (l+€).
31It is straightforward to check that these strategies (with the price of the seller equal to p' whenever
M>M*) do in fact constitute an equilibrium as long as pr ￿ mm (mL vb (l+€) mU ys)
Noticethat mm (m' v" (l+e), mU v5) =mLvb (l+c) if and only if k￿p., and mm (m'S vb (1+€), mU
vs) =mUvs if and only if k ￿p.. Thus, if k ￿p., there are equilibria of this type with pr up to m" vs. The
relevance of this is that jfpr =mUvs, the probability of trade is equal to one and the outcome is efficient.
On the other hand, jfpr￿mU vS, note that this implies a probability of trade equal to one given
optimal behavior on the seller's part and, optimality on the buyer's part reduces to pr <p.. These two (i.e.,
pr mU v5 and pr<ybp.) are mutually consistent if and only if k ￿j.t.
Theequilibrium that maximizes the utility of the seller is the one in which pr is at its maximal level.
This is given by pt =v"p. when k ￿p. and pr =m'v1' (l+€) when k> p..
In this equilibrium, when k> p., trade occurs whenever m' ￿ M ￿ M* =mL(1+E)/(l_€).Thus, the
probability of trade is given by:
Pim
L =_____
(1€)) mL(1+€) (1÷€) I(1÷€)k
and converges to 2 when k-.c'o, with p.=p.(k).
In the case that k ￿p., this maximum probability of trade is given by one. Given the definition of
k', it follows that k ￿p., if and only ifk ￿ k'; and k> p., if and only ifk> k'. U
Definitionof P functions
Using the results from Proposition 3.1.3 the seller's payoff, in the (I,U) case, can be written as, W5(I,U,k)1-
) + vbT(I,U,k), where
I T(I,U,k) =(e2m+l)/2e2m*k, if k￿k
T'(I,U,k)
L. T(I,U,k) =(e2m_1)' {(1_e)e2m*l(_( 1 -2€))} if k>k',
It follows that,
(i) V(I,U,k) is a continuous function of k,
(ii)V(I,U,k) is a decreasing function of k,
(iii)limkO T'(I,U,k) 1, lim. Ts(I,U,k)= (1-€),
(iv)T5(I,U,k) is a differentiable function of k, except at k'i'.
Similar expressions hold for the buyer. Denote the buyer's expected utility by Wb(I,U,k)=?
+ vTb(I,U,k) where,
iT(I,U,k)[ 1 _(e2m+ 1 )I2e2m}, ifk￿ k''
T"(I,U,k)
t.T(I,U,k)= (e2m*k_ 1) [((1 -2c)-( I -2c))/2 +(( 1 -2e)- 1)], if k>k''.
Direct calculations show that,
(i) T"(I,U,k) is a continuous function of k,
(ii)D(I,U,k) is increasing for k￿k' and decreasing for k>k'r,
(iii)lim0 Tb(I,U,k)0, limkT(I,U,k)=O,
(iv)T'(I,U,k) is a differentiable function of k, except at k=k'.
32Consider next the case in which an uninformed buyer meets an informed seller (U,I) (section 3.2),
From Proposition 3.2.1, the seller's utility can be written as W5(U,I,k)=l-). + vbTs(U,I,k), where,
I I ifk￿k'
Ts(U,I,k)
T(U,I,k) =l-€+ 2c2e2m*k/[(l+E)(e2m_1)] if k￿k',
Note that T5(U,I,k) satisfies:
(i) Tt'(U,I,k) is a continuous function of k,
(ii)V(U,I,k) is decreasing for k￿k,
(iii)lim,0 ys(UIk)=1 limkT5(U,I,k)=l-€ + 2c2/(1+€),
(iv)T(U,I,k) is a differentiable function of k, except at k=k.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: It is convenient to prove first a series of auxiliary results in the form of lemmas.
Lemma] Assume 4)<€v". For each 4),thereis a unique value of k, denoted k1(4)), such that,
i) vb'P(I,U,ki(4))) =v"-4).
ii) vhV(I,U,k) > vb4), for k < k1(4)), and v1Ts(I,U,k) <v'-4) for k> k(4)).
iii) k(4)) is decreasing in 4)andconverges to 0 as 4)goesto zero.
Proof The results trivially follow from the properties of the function Ts(I,U,k) as given in Appendix B.
There it is shown that Ts(I,U,k) is a decreasing function of k and that Ts(I,U,O) 1. These properties imply
our results.
Lemma 2 Assume that 4)<€v". For each 4),thereexist two distinct values of k, denoted k2(4)) and k3(4))
(without loss of generality assume that k3<k2) such that,
i) vTb(I,u,k(4))) =4).
ii) v"T'(I,U,k) <4),fork<k3(4)) and k>k2(4)), and viTb(I,U,k)>4) for k E (k3(4)),k2(4))).
iii) k2(4)) is increasing in 4)andconverges to as 4)goesto zero.
Proof It follows trivially from the properties of the function Tb(I,U,k) described in Appendix B. The key
properties are that Tb(I,U,k) is a continuous function of k, T"(I,U,O)O, limkT"(I,U,k)0, and that T"(I,U,k)
is increasing for k￿ k' and decreasing for k>k'. Finally, the assumption that 4)issmall implies Tt'(I,U,k')>
4).Theconvergence of k2(4)) to zero as 4)goesto oofollowsfrom k2(4))>k, and from lim Tb(I,U,k)0, and
T'(I,U,k) decreasing for k>k,'.
Lemma 3 Assume that 4)<€vt'. Then, k1(4))k3(4))<k'r<k2(4)).
Proof The two inequalities follow trivially from the previous result. We next prove that k1(4))k3(4)). For
k<k', the calculations in Appendix B show that v'Y(I,U,k)+ vbTt)(I,U,k)=vb. It follows that if kk1(4)) we
have v'V(I,U,k1(4)))+ ylrfb(IUk1(4)))vbThisequality is just, -4)+v"T1'(I,U,k1(4)),€)0. However, for k<k
this is the definition of k3(4)).
Proof of the Theorem:
i) It follows from Lemma 3.
33ii) For k E(O,k1(4))),it follows that vbTs(I,U,k) >vb-4),and vbTb(I,U,k) <4). Inspectionof the payoffs in
Table 1 show that playing (U,U) is an equilibrium in dominant strategies, as both players are better off not
acquiring information.
iii) At k =k1(4)),we have that v"T(I,U,k) =vb4),and v1'T"(I,U,k) =4). First,note that in all cases if the buyer
is uninformed, the seller's best response is to be uninformed. This is because in the (U,U) case the seller
extracts all the surplus and it does not have to pay for the information. In this region (U,U) is an equilibrium
as well. If the buyer is informed, the seller is indifferent between being informed or uninformed (this follows
from vtT(I,U,k) =vt'-4)). Thus,the seller's best response to the buyer being informed is either U or I. On the
other hand, if the seller chooses U, the buyer's best response is either U or I. However if the seller selects I,
the buyer's best response is U. It then follows that the outcome (I,U) is another equilibrium outcome. These
arguments also show that a mixed strategy equilibrium of the type describe always exist, since buyers are
indifferent between I and U, whenever sellers play U.
iv) The region k E(k1(4)),k2(4)))corresponds to the case vbTs(I,U,k) <v'-4),andvbTb(I,U,k)> 4).Letb(k)
andTts(k) be, respectively, the probability that buyers and sellers play I. Consider first the payoff of the
buyers given the strategy of the sellers. They are given by,
If the buyer chooses U, he/she gets
If the buyer choose I, he/she gets it5(k)(X-4)) +(lrts(k))(?L+vbTb4)).
Forthe buyer to be indifferent between the two, it must be the case that -rc5(k)4)+( 1 rts(k))(
orit'(k)=( v 4))/vbTt). Now, consider the sellers' best response. The seller's payoffs are given by,
If the seller chooses U, he/she gets tb(k)( I _..+vbTs(I,U))+( 1 _ltb(k))( 1 _A+vb).
If the seller chooses I, he/she gets b(k)(1X+vb)+ (1tb(k))(l?+vtT(U,I))-4).
Thus,for sellers to be indifferent between the two actions it must be the case that,
=[(4)/v")+(1 _Ts(U,I))}/[( 1 _Ts(I,U)) +( 1 __fs(,J))]•
It is straightforward to check that these probabilities are between zero and one, and hence that these
are equilibrium mixed strategies.
v) At the point k=k2(4)), we have shown that vbTs(I,U,k) <v'-4),and vbTl(I,U,k) =4). Thisis the region
where, if they knew they would meet an uninformed seller, buyers would be indifferent between acquiring
information or not. It turns out that the value of information is zero in this case. Thus, the unique equilibrium
is (U,U). Finally, for k>k2(4)), the value of information is too small and U is a dominant strategy for both
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